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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

HENRY HUMMEL and MABEL D.
HUMMEL, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CASE
NO. 7849

WILLIAM YOUNG and MAUD M.
YOUNG, his wife, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEl\IENT OF CASE
The respmadents by their complaint (R. 3) claimed the
ownership of the property located at 926 Springville Road
in Provo, Utah, and that the appellants owned property adjoining them on the North. Respondents complained further that appellants had trespassed on their ground by building a fence South of the appellants' deeded property line and
had enclosed behind that fence a portion of the respondents'
land; that the respondents discovered the trespass by a reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cent survey of these properties and notified appellants and
began moving the fence back to the true deeded boundary
line; and that appellants threatened to do violence if respondents moved the fence and refused to permit them to
do so. The respondents sought an injunction, damages, and
to have their title quieted. The appellants in their answer
(R. 8) generally denied that they had trespassed upon the
respondents' ground and set up several defenses to respondents' claim: (1) The seven-year statute of limitations
and adverse possession of the ground behind their fence
for more than the statutory period, (2) that the fence in
question was built in 1928 as a result of a settlement of dispute between appellant William Young and A. H. LeVitre
and L~dia C. LeVitre, predecessors of respondents, over
the boundary between their properties, (3) that appellants
cultivated and occ4pied all of the land up to the fence since
it was built from the North, and that respondents and pre. decessors have done likewise on the South side, and (4)
that the parties have at all times since the fence was built
treated it as the boundary between their properties and
that it was located as such boundary. A trial was had before the court, sitting without a jury, in which the issues
raised by the pleadings were resolved against defendants
and judgment given for plaintiffs. From this judgment appellants appeal .
STATEl\'IENT OF FACTS

We cannot agree entirely with counsel's "Statement of
Facts" as set forth in appellants' brief. There is no citation
to the record in the brief. We prefer to state the facts fully
and cite the record in support of same. The respondents
by Warranty Deed acquired the premises described in paraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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graph 2 of count one of their complaint on April 27, 1945,
and same is identified on their Exhibit '' J" as Tract 2 (R.
106), and contains 1 acre of land together with improvements thereon. The appellants own the premises adjoining
the respondents on the North containing 1.04 acres of land,
together with improvements, the same being designated as
Tract 1 on plaintiffs' Exhibit "J'', appellant William Young
having acquired the same by Warranty Deed from one
Cavel in about the year 1925 (D. Ex. 1-R. 106). There is
a presently existing wire division fence between the respective properties of the parties, but the same is not on the
boundary line described in their respective deeds (Tr. 19).
This wire fence was built by the appellant, William Young,
probably in 1928 (Tr. 46-7), while Lydia C. LeVitre was the
record owner of the resspondents' premises. The respondents caused a survey of their property, as well as that of
the appellants, to be made in September of 1950, and the
same shows that the division fence encroaches upon respondents' land along the North side thereof about 6 feet on the
East end and 10.9 feet on the West end and deprives respondents of about .08 of an acre of their ground which is
enclosed on appellants' side of the fence (Tr. 18-20).
For several weeks before the fence was built the appellant William Young was being damaged by the trespassing cows and horses of one Chris Peterson, who was the
owner of the parcel of land adjoining that of the respondents on the South, which was designated as Tract 3 of the
plat, plaintiffs' Exhibit ''J" (Tr. 46-47). The fence was built
pursuant to an arrangement between the appellant William
Young and Chris Peterson, whereby the latter furnished the
post and wire and the former built the fence (Tr. 47). The
fence was put on a line appellants claim was designated by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A. H. LeVitre shortly before the fence was built in 1928
(Tr. 49). A. H. LeVitre had conveyed respondents' property (Tract 2) on May 8, 1924, to Lydia C. LeVitre, some
4 years prior to the fence being built (Tr. 42). Neither A.
H. LeVitre nor Lydia C. LeVitre lived on Tract 2 at the time
the fence was built (Tr. 59-60).
The appellant, William Young, testified that he always
thought he had built the fence in question on his true deeded
line, and never knew any different until the respondents
had the survey made in September, 1950. The appellant,
William Young, testified as to what land he claimed after
he acquired Tract 1 in 1925, as follows (Tr. 69-70):
"Q. Now when you acquired your property in 1925,
what property did you intend to claim?
A. Property I intended to claim?
Q. Yes.
A.' One and four-hundredths acres ,of course.
Q. And that was the property described in your
deed?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did you ever intend to claim more property
than was described in your deed?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you ever intend to claim any land not described in your own deed?
At that time?
A. Why, no I didn't. Why should I?
Q. Did you ever intend to claim any land described in your neighbor's deed on the south?
A. No, I didn't.
,
Q. The only land that you ever did intend to
claim, or ever have claimed, was the land described in
your deed; is that correct?
A. Yes."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although upon being questioned by his counsel after
the above evidence was adduced from him on cross-examination, the appellant, William Young, further testified as
follows (Tr. 72) :
"Q. Have you ever intended to claim less property
than that which is enclosed by the fences there at the
present time?
A. No sir.
Q. You intend to claim all that's inside the fences?
A. Yes sir.
Q. So that when you said that you intend to claim
only the described property, you understood that the
described property was inside the fences?
A. Yes sir.
Q. The fences enclosing that described property?
A. Yes sir. Just what is in there. One and fourhundredths acres.
Q. So when you say that you intended only to
claim the property described by your deed, that is what
you think is enclosed by the fence?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you have intended to claim all that's inside the fence?
A. Yes sir."

But on re-cross-examination the appellant finally testifide on this matter as follows (Tr. 74):
"Q. Now of course your claim is that the fence enclosed only the property that was described in your
deed; isn't that right?
A. Yes."

Thus, the appellant shows no adverse claim to plaintiffs' .08 acre piece of land that lays behind the fence he
had built in 1928.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellants claimed in their answer that (R. 9):
". . . the fence . . . . was built in the
spring of 1928 as a result of the settlement of a dispute
as to the location of the boundary between William
Young, and A. H. LeVitre ad Lydia C .LeVitre, the
plaintiffs' predecessors in title, and that said fence was
built as the boundary between the property of defendants and the property of plaintiffs' predecessors;"
But the appellants failed to adduce any evidence to support this claim. In this connection the defendant, William
Young, testified as follows (Tr. 65-67):
"So that there was never any dispute between you
and LeVitre about where the boundary line between
you was?
A. No sir.
Q. That is your north line and his south line?
A. Yes. My south line is his north line.
Q. Your south line is his north line?
A. Yes.
Q. You say there wasn't any dispute about that?
A. No.
Q. You had your deed to yours?
A. Yes, one and four-hundredths acres, that's all.
Q. And he had his deed to his?
A. Yes.
Q. You both bought from the same people, didn't
you?
A. No. LeVitre sold to Cavell and Cavell sold
to me.
Q. When was the first time anything came up
about the boundary line between you and Mr. LeVitre?
A. We never ·had anything about the boundary
line between LeVitre and I. Never had any trouble
about it until now.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Did you ever make any agreement about it?
No.
Q. No agreement about it?
A. No agreement, no.
Q. ·Did you ever discuss it with LeVitre?
A. Yes. When first moved there he used to
come around when I was building chicken houses and
talk around. We were pretty good friends, I thought.
Q. I mean did you ever discuss the matter of
this boundary with him?
A.. Yes, but wouldn't discuss it every day.
Q. You never had any differences ahout it?
Q.

A.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

No.

Never any dispute about it?
No.
There was never any uncertainty about it

at all?
No.
And of course there was no agreement between you and LeVitre concerning it?
A. Not any more than told us where it was, and
told me where the points were, and that's where I put
the fence.
Q. Now tell us about that.
A. That's all there is to tell.
Q. I mean these points that you mentioend.
A. Well, showed me where they were, a big tree
on one side and had a mark on the fence at the bottom on the other.
Q. Did he tell you at that time that a survey
had been made?
A. A what had been made?
Q. A survey had been made?
A. Yes.
Q. Hie told you at that Ume?
A. Yes.
Q. About when was that?
A.
Q.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

Oh, along in '25, after I bought the place.
1925?
Yes.
There was never any written agreement between you and Mr. LaVitre?
A. No.
Q. You say there was no occasion for it?
A. No, not that I know of.
Q. No dispute or any uncertainty as to where
the line was?
A. No."
Q.
A.
Q.

There is no evidence that Lydia C. LeVitre or A. H.
UeVitre acquiesced in the fence as the boundary between
Tract 1 and Tract 2 after same was built by appellant William Young in 1928. The record shows that the LeVitres
had moved away from Tract 2 (Tr. 59-60) and perhaps
did not know the fence had been built. The evidence is
that Ernest Farrer acquired title to Tract 2 by Warranty
Deed on August 24, 1936, from Lydia C. LeVitre (Tr. 42)
and conveyed it away to one William 0. McMeen and wife
on September 15, 1944 (Tr. 43), but there is no evidence
whatsoever that Ernest Farrer ever recognized or acquiesced in the fence as the boundary between Tract 1 and
Tract 2, and the record is silent as to any acquiescence on
the part of McMeen for the year he owned Tract 2 before
conveying same to the plaintiff on April 27, .1945. The
record positively shows that respondents did not recognize
the ~ence as the boundary line between their property and
appellants' property. They caused the survey to be made
in September, 1950, (Tr. 6 and 18) well within 7 years
after they took possession, and upon discovery that appelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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!ants' fence was encroaching on their property, took steps
to put the fence on the deeded line that resulted in this
lawsuit (Tr. 7-11). The record further discloses that upon
demand by respondents, the Gas Company permitted plaintiffs to move the fence North to the deeded line in connection with the piece of Tract 1 that had previously been conveyed to it by appellants (Tr. 9).
The most that can be said on this record in support
of appellants' claimed acquiescence theory is that appellant
Wiliam Young built the fence in question in 1928 in order
to protect his gardens from the trespassing animals of
Chris Peterson, and that the fence has remained where it
was built dividing Tract 1 and Tract 2 ever since.
There is no evidence that the appellants have ever
paid any taxes whatsoever on the .08 of an acre in dispute
in this lawsuit, and the record positively shows that the
respondents and their predecessors have always paid the
taxes thereon (Tr. 5) (R. 106).
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS
I.

APPELLANTS' APPEAL RAISES ONLY THE

QUESTION AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT
"APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY OF RESPONDENTS'
LAND.''
II.

THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN

MAKING THE FINDINGS HEREIN OR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW THERTO.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS' APPEAL RAISES ONLY THE
QUESTION AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUST.MN THE COURT'S FINDING THAT
''APPELLANTS OCCUPY ANY OF RESPONDENTS'
LAND.''
Utah Rules of Ovil Procedure, Rule 52{b), provides
as follows:
"Upon motion of a party made not later than 10
days after entry of judgment the court may amend
its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
·When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter
be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such
findings or has made either a motion to amend them,
a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial."
Under this rule appellants had a right to move the
court for an amendment of or additional findings. This
they failed to do. They were not thereby precluded from
thereafter raising a "question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings." But it would seem that
appellants are thereby precluded from raising any question
as to the court's failure to make additional findings. Especially is this true since the court made findings on all
issues raised by the pleadings. Points I and II made by
appellants in their brief are based on alleged error in failSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing to make findings and therefore they are not before the
court on this appeal.
Appellants' Point III assails the court's finding that
"the appellants occupy any of the respondents' land" upon
the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support same.
Evidently counsel refers to finding 4 (R. 12), which is as
follows:
"That the defendants have trespassed upon and
taken a portion of the plaintiffs' above described land
on the North side thereof by constructing a fence
thereon South of defendants' boundary line and enclosing said portion of plaintiffs' land behind said
fence unlawfully and in violation of the plaintiffs' ownership of their above described lands."
The argument is that the surveyor did not take into
account the overages in section 7, where the land in controversy lies . Appellants' counsel seems to say that there
was uncertainty affecting the survey of the appellants' and
respondents' lands (Tract 1 and Tract 2-Ex. J) because
the surveyor failed to consider the overages of section 7
when he surveyed it. That this is not the record is shown
by the surveyor's final words on the matter (Tr. 36-37)
as follows by Mr. Ballif on redirect:
''Q. Now you were acquainted at the time you
made the survey with the discrepancies in Section 7?
A. Yes, I have the actual measured distance between every section corner that there is record of in
the County .
Q. And in making this survey, you took that
discrepancy into consideration·?
A. I did.
Q. And you determined that the property to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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south, the Peterson property had been surveyed. And
did your survey concide with that?
A. I did not determine that the Peterson property had been surveyed by actual information as to
who it had been done by, but I assumed it had been
surveyed because of the fact that my findings on the
ground actually checked with the 'boundary line in
their description.
Q. So that you found the south fence of Hummels' substantially on the deeded description line?
A. It is on the Peterson deed, not the Hummel."
The testimony of the surveyor (Tr. 17-41) amply sustains the assailed finding. Indeed there is no evidence in
the record to the contrary.
POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN MAKING THE FINDINGS HEREIN OR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW THERETO.
In our Statement of Facts, supra, we cited appellants'
testimony to show that the fence in question was not built
pursuant to an agreement between him and LeVitre. But
counsel in appellants' brief makes the unsupported claim
that there was such an agreement (Br. of A 11 and 12).
Another claim made by counsel which the evidence fails
to support is that "respondents and their predecessors cultivated and used the land . . . to the fence . . ."
The fact is LeVitre ,the common prodecessor to both parties, never cultivated or used the land in question (Tr. 58).
There is no evidence that LeVitre built sheds or a garage
along the South side of the said fence (Tr. 51). The orchard
on appellants' side of the fence was planted only five years
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ago (Tr. 61) and these trees are North of the deeded boundary line and on appellants' deeded land (Tr. 63). With
these corrections our statement of the facts reflects the
record in this case. The record amply sustains the court's
findings. It is our position that the conclusions and judgment follow the law applicable to this factual situation.
At the trial respondents claimed the true boundary
between Tracts 1 and 2 (Ex. J) to be the deeded line, and
appellants claimed it was the fence. Appellants based
their claim upon three grounds: (1)the statute of limitations and adverse possession for more than 7 years, (2)
that the predecessors of both parties made an oral agreement as to the disputed boundary line pursuant to which
the fence was built, and (3) that respondents' predecessors
have acquiesced in the fence as the boundary since the
same was built in 1928 . Appellants failed to adduce evidence sustaining either of these claims, and the court so
found.
We believe that the law governing this case is established by Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 267 P. 912. In that
case the plaintiff held the title to a piece of land. Defendant held the record title to an adjoining parcel. Both of
these parties were on the land prior to patent. An irregular fence was put up by the plaintiff's predecessor in title
in the year 1870 to enclose land to be used for garden purposes . Later on defendant's predecessor in title came on
the land and same was used jointly by them. Subsequently
a survey was made and the boundary line between the
properties in question was established. This boundary line
showed record title to the disputed land to be in plaintiff's
predecessor . The fence line was not changed and the parties went ahead using the land jointly for vegetable garSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dens. Plaintiff brought action in 1922 claiming the ownership of the land. The trial court found for the defendant on the theory that the fence boundary had been acquiesced in for a long period of time. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed the decision, holding that the title to the
land behind the survey line fence still rested in the plaintiff.
In this case the defendant endeavored to establish
title to the disputed land (1) hy adverse possession, (2)
by oral agreement that the fence should be the boundary
line, and (3) that the parties and their predecessors had
acquiesced in the boundary for a long period of time.
These are substantially the claims made b)' the defendants in the case at bar. On each of these contentions the
court held against the defendant and had the following
to say:
"It is clear that defendants have failed to establish
title to the land in controversy by adverse possession,
because neither they nor their predecessors in title
ever paid any taxes thereon.

". . . . It is therefore clear that defendants' claim
to the land in controversy must stand or fall either
upon an express agreement fixing the boundary line,
or upon acquiescence in a boundary line .between the
land owned by plaintiff and that owned by defendants.
"So far as length of time is concerned, the fence
claimed by defendants as marking the boundary line
has been established for a sufficiently long period to
support defendants' claim. 11i was erected in about
the year 1870 ,and, according to the testimony of defendants, it has remaind in the same location until
this suit was begun in 1922. According to the rule
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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laid down by the textwriters and practically all of the
adjudicated cases where the question is discussed, one
of the requisites necessary to the establishment of a
boundary line other than the true boundary line between adjoining landowners by oral agreement or
acquiescence, in the absence of adverse possession or
estoppel, is that the location of the true boundary
sought to be thus established is or has been uncertain
or in dispute . . . . ."
The record in the instant case shows that the LeVitres
had moved away from the premises before appellants built
the fence in question and perhaps knew nothing of it.. It
further conclusively appears that there was no uncertainty
as to the boundary even when LeVitre owned Tract 2t
some four years before appellant Young built th~ fence.
And the record further discloses that there was no agreement, oral or written, between appellants and Lydia C.
LeVitre nor A. H. LeVitre, her husband, that the fence
should be built where same was built in 1928 or that it
should be the boundary between Tract 1 and Tract 2 (Ex.
J). The most that can be sustained from the evidence is
that shortly before appellant Young built the fence in 1928
A. H. LeVitre, who was then a stranger to the title of Tract
2, designated where the fence should be by referring to a
tree and a back fence . The conclusion is inescapable that
the fence in question never was intended as a boundary
when it was built. It was erected to keep Petersons livestock from damaging appellants' garden.
Brown v. Millner, (1951) 232 P2d, 202, is one of the
very recent utterances of the Utah Supreme Court on the
question of boundary disputes . It involved a disputed
tract of land in Summit County. Appellant claimed title
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the land in dispute under a deed while the respondent
claims title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
and by adverse possession. Appellant appealed from a
judgment quieting title to the disputed area in the respondent and the holding of the lower court was reversed with
directions to enter judgment in favor of the appellant. The
court refused to apply the doctrine of ''boundary by acquiescence" contended for by respondent, and said:
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary
disputes reveals that it has long been recoginzed in
this state that when the location of the true boundary
between two adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol
agreement, establish the boundary line and thereby
irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees. Rydalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 P. 25; Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 267 P. 912. In the latter case this
court pointed out that when the location of the true
boundary is known to the adjoining owners any parol
agreement between them establishing the boundary
elsewhere would be an attempt to transfer an interest
in realty without complying with the statute of frauds.
But, we stated, if the location of the true boundary is
not known to the adjoining owners, a parol agreement
between them fixing its location is not regarded as
transferring an interest in land but merely determining the location of existing estates.
"We have further held in this state that in the
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or their predecessors in interest ever expressly
agreed as to the location of the boundary between
them, if they have occupied their respective premises
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings for a long period of time
and mutually recognized it as the dividing line between
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so consistently with the
facts appearing, and. will not permit the parties nor
their grantees to depart from such line. Holmes v.
Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009.
. However
in that case we were careful to mark off the limits of
the rule. Said the court:
'We do not wish to be understood as holding
that the parties may not claim to the true boundary, where an assumed or agreed boundary is
located through mistake or inadvertence, or
where it is clear that the line as located was not
intended as a boundary, and where a botmdary
so located has not been acquiesced in for a long
term of years by the parties in interest.'
"
. Does the fence which was constructed
constructed by the defendant in the old channel constitute a boundary line from which the parties may
not now depart? That question must be answered
in the negative. No claim is made by the defendant
that he erected the fence pursuant to an express agreement with the plaintiff's father, who was then the
owner of tract #1, as to where the boundary should
be located. Nor can it be implied that such an agreement ever took place as in Holmes v. Judge, supra,
and the cases following it cited above. The defendant, who personally built the fence, does not contend
that he ever as much as had a discussion with the
plaintiff or his father concerning the location of the
boundary between them. He testified, and his wife
corroborated him, that when he had finished building the fence the plaintiff came along and inquired
what he (the defendant) was doing and that nothing
more was said. Were the record silent as to the
circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence
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suance of an agreement between the adjoining owners
as to the location of the boundary between them, such
as was done in Holmes v. Judge, supra. But in the
instant case, as in Peterson v. Johnson, supra; Home
Owners' Loan Corporation v. !Dudley, supra; and Glenn
v. Whitney, supra, there is no room under the evidence
for such an implication to be drawn. Thus we conclude that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
has no application under the evidence."
Neither is there any room for the doctrine of Brown
v. Millner to be applied to the facts of the case at bar.
There was no agreement on the part of Lydia C. LeVitre
that the appellant should build the fence when or where
it was built. Both she and her husband, A. H. LeVitre, had
moved away from Tract 2 before the fence was built and
had no knowledge of it. There is no evidence that Ernest
Farrer, who acquired title to Tract 2 from Lydia C.
LeVitre, or William 0. McMeen, who acquired title to same
from Farrer, ever lived on the property or knew of the
fence, let alone acquiescing in same as the boundary. The
record shows positively that respondents never acquiesced
in the fence as the boundary for the 7 year period established by Ekburg v. Bates, 239 P2d 205. They acquired
the property April 27, 1945, and caused the survey to be
made in September, 1950, which resulted in this lawsuit.
CONCLUSION

The findings of the court are amply sustained by the
evidence, and upon the record and the law the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE S. BALLIF,
Attorney for Respondents
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